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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
John R. Crook∗ 
¶ 1 I appreciate Professor Cassel’s invitation to join in this distinguished 
company.  I must tell you that I’m a bit out of place here.  I’m not a scholar of either 
human rights law or of the International Court of Justice, although I’ve had some 
professional experience with and written on both. I’m a journeyman international 
lawyer, so I will deal today with some journeyman points.   
¶ 2 Some of these may seem at odds with the ambitions of this symposium.  
However, I think it’s important to have a fair understanding of the procedural and 
institutional factors defining the ICJ’s field of action.  
¶ 3 My starting point is that ICJ is not a specialized human rights institution, 
either in terms of its mandate, its jurisdiction, its procedures, or its personnel.  Each of 
these elements may well limit the Court’s future role in the human rights arena.  I will 
briefly address each.2   
I.      The Court’s Mandate   
¶ 4 The only contentious cases the ICJ can hear are cases between States.  
Individuals have no right of direct access.3  This is an important difference between 
the ICJ and other human rights institutions that allow some type of direct access.  This 
limitation reflects the State-centered view of international law prevailing when the 
statute of the ICJ’s predecessor was drawn up after World War I. It does not mean 
that energetic and imaginative counsel can never get individual clients’ situations 
before the Court, as Donald Donovan’s work shows.  Still, it is a significant 
limitation. 
¶ 5 The ICJ also issues advisory opinions on legal questions if asked by the 
General Assembly or Security Council or by another U.N. organ or specialized 
agency authorized by the General Assembly.4 The Court has made some important 
contributions to human rights processes through advisory opinions, as I will mention 
later on. 
                                                 
∗ General Counsel, Multinational Force and Observers, Rome; Commissioner, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission.  The views expressed are solely the author’s, and do not reflect the positions of the 
Multinational Force and Observers or any other person or group. 
2 For surveys of recent developments in the Court see John R. Crook, The 2000 Judicial Activity of the 
International Court of Justice, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 685 (2001); John R. Crook, The 2001 Judicial 
Activity of the International Court of Justice, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 397 (2002); John R. Crook, The 2002 
Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 352 (2003). 
3 “Only States may be parties in cases before the Court.”  Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art. 34(1), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm. 
4 U.N. CHARTER art. 96.  
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¶ 6 There are no limits on the sorts of inter-State legal disputes the Court can 
hear.  However, a few types of cases have provided much of its work. More than half 
its cases have involved disputes over land frontiers and maritime boundaries.  South 
Africa generated four advisory opinions and two judgments.5 The Court has also 
served as a sort of Constitutional court for the United Nations. Several advisory 
opinions have established key principles regarding powers and functions within the 
U.N.6   
¶ 7 There have been a few ICJ (and PCIJ) decisions significantly contributing 
to human rights law,7 but historically they have been a small part of the docket. To 
give an unscientific illustration, if you look at the indexes of the five recent volumes 
of the I.C.J. Reports covering 1994-1997 sitting in my bookcase, you’ll see very few 
references to “human rights.”  Those you do see are concentrated in dissenting or 
separate opinions of a few judges.8  Thus, human rights issues have been an 
intermittent and not especially important part of the Court’s work.   
¶ 8 In recent years, there have been a few more such cases, helping to stimulate 
this symposium. The Court’s responses have varied. When faced with competing 
legal values, today’s Court does not necessarily give human rights claims special 
weight or authority.  It takes such claims quite seriously, but I do not see it as taking a 
uniformly “pro-human rights” approach. 
¶ 9 In some cases, human rights values obviously have been given great 
weight.  In the two consular notification cases by Paraguay and Germany against the 
United States,9 it clearly was of central importance to the Court that the cases 
ultimately involved convicted persons facing capital punishment.  I think this 
significantly shaped both the procedures and the final result, although the Court’s task 
was made simpler by the fact that the United States admitted the core violation of the 
Convention.  I hope that Donald Donovan will address these cases, in which he played 
an important role as counsel for Paraguay and Germany. I will not go into them 
beyond indicating the general thought that the Court handled those cases as it did, and 
reached some of the results it reached, because they involved the administration of the 
death penalty.  For the Court, this aspect was much more compelling than the 
arguments regarding state practice and the construction of the treaty advanced by the 
United States.  
¶ 10 The Court has also done its part to reinforce the U.N.’s rather modest 
human rights machinery. A pair of advisory opinions confirmed that Special 
                                                 
5 See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 (7th ed. 
1997). 
6 E.g., Conditions of Admission of State to Membership in United Nations (Article 4 of Charter), 1948 
I.C.J. 63 (May 28); Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 
11); Certain Expenses of United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).   
7 See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Seminal Contributions of the World Court to the Law of Human 
Rights, Address to the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, Fifth Sess., Proceedings (Dec. 
1998).  
8 Report of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of 1994 has no index entry for “Human Rights.”  
Report of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of 1995 has one.  The two volumes for 1996 have 
thirty-one, over half in Judge Weeramantry’s dissent in Legality of Use by State of Nuclear Weapons 
in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8).  The 1997 volume cites to ten pages.  
9 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand (F.R.G. 
v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27). 
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Rapporteurs carrying out human rights mandates for ECOSOC’s human rights bodies 
should be accorded the privileges and immunities of U.N. Experts on Mission under 
the U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities.  They also confirmed that Special 
Rapporteurs are entitled to assert those privileges and immunities against their own 
governments.10  
¶ 11 I once had the pleasure of meeting Ambassador Mazilu, whose troubles 
with his home authorities in Romania led to the first of these cases.  He expressed 
deep gratitude for the Court’s opinion. The second case involved the Special 
Rapporteur on Independence of the Judiciary, who faced extensive and expensive 
legal proceedings at home in Malaysia for critical comments made to the press 
regarding certain judicial proceedings there. The ICJ concluded that he should be 
immune from such suits, although the Malaysian Courts have so far apparently 
disagreed.11   
¶ 12 However, these cases do not establish a clear trend; the Court has not 
always received human rights claims so supportively.  In the 1996 advisory 
proceeding on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, it was vigorously argued that 
the use of nuclear weapons would unlawfully violate the right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life under Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.12  The 
Court did not buy it. It agreed that Article 6 of the Covenant applied in wartime, but 
found that what is arbitrary must be determined through the applicable lex specialis—
the law of armed conflict.13   
¶ 13 Indeed, even in the LaGrand case, the Court seemed a bit reluctant to 
extend the sphere of human rights.  Jurisdiction over one of Germany’s claims 
required a finding that the Convention conferred individual rights on the LaGrand 
brothers as a matter of international law.  This led to a lively debate whether the right 
to consular notification was a human right.  The Court declined to decide this 
question. It found that the Convention by its terms conferred individual rights on the 
brothers, and it simply did not need to decide whether these could be viewed as 
human rights.14  
¶ 14 The Court’s recent judgment in Arrest Warrant is also significant.15  
Human rights groups have heavily criticized the judgment,16 particularly some of the 
                                                 
10 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, 1998 I.C.J. 177, 200 (Dec. 15); Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of 
a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 26). 
11 BBC News, Malaysian Court Rejects U.N. Ruling (Oct. 18, 1999), at 
http://news.bbc.co/uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/478224.stm.  
12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 240 (July 8). 
13 Id.  para. 25.  
14 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 77, para. 78. This contrasts with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
approach to Mexico’s request for an advisory opinion on questions related to consular notification.  
That Court only had jurisdiction to render the advisory opinion if the right of consular access was a 
human right.  The Court so found, and rendered the requested advisory opinion.  The Right to 
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, 
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1999).  
15 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 11, para. 27 (Feb. 14). 
16 Human Rights Watch Press Release, Disappointment on Belgian War-Crimes Ruling (Feb. 14, 
2002), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/icj0215.htm; International Commission of Jurists Press 
Release, International Court of Justice’s Ruling on Belgian Arrest Warrant Undermines International 
Law (Feb. 15, 2002), at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id.article=2622&lang=en.  
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dicta. What the Court actually holds in the operative part of the judgment strikes me 
as a plausible balance between the requirements of international accountability and of 
carrying on international relations.  That said, I don’t think the judgment does an 
effective job of documenting the immunity of incumbent foreign ministers under 
customary international law.17 It also contains dicta suggesting that former foreign 
ministers are absolutely immune in national courts for past official acts.  This dicta is 
both highly problematic and not necessary to decide the case.18  
¶ 15 An advantage of being a journeyman is that you can speculate fact-free 
about how other lawyers handled their cases. I hope that Daniel Bethlehem or others 
familiar with Arrest Warrant can tell us whether there was some agreement by the 
parties to narrow the scope of the case to discourage the Court from addressing the 
Congo’s initial claim that Belgium’s assertion of jurisdiction violated international 
law.19  Instead, the Congo (quite successfully) relied on the argument that incumbent 
foreign ministers have absolute inviolability and immunity.   
¶ 16 Belgium emphasized that the Congo had dropped its initial attack on 
Belgium’s assertion of universal jurisdiction, and argued that the Court could not rule 
on it under the principle of non ultra petita, that the Court should decide only the 
issues the parties ask it to decide.20 The Court responded by essentially assuming for 
purposes of considering the immunity claim that there was jurisdiction, a result 
criticized by several judges. 21 
¶ 17 What to make of all this?  A short answer is that, in cases involving 
seriously contending legal values from different strands of international law, the Court 
will make a conscientious effort to rank the claims and if need be to find a balance.  
However, it will not necessarily give primacy to human rights considerations.  
II.      Limits on the Contentious Jurisdiction 
¶ 18 The second potential limit on the Court’s role is its limited jurisdiction to 
hear contentious cases.  Jurisdiction is the foundation of international adjudication; 
compelling facts or legal theories are no good if the Court can’t hear them. 
                                                 
17 E.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 18, 19 para. 51-53 (Feb. 14) 
(assuming the existence of such immunity under customary law, but present little substantiating 
authority).  See id. paras. 11-13, at 5-7 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Wan den Wyngaert 
emphasizing the lack of discussion of state practice or opinio juris).  
18 Id. para. 61. The Court does not address whether official acts could include offenses such as war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.  Former Foreign Ministers have indeed been held accountable 
before international tribunals. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Nazi Germany’s Foreign Minister, was among 
those tried, convicted and executed at Nuremberg.  See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS, 351-53 (1992). 
19 See Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 1, para. 2 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans 
and Buergenthal).  These Judges, all known for their prior involvement in human rights work, argued 
that the Court should have addressed the issue head-on.  Id. para. 3. 
20 Id. para. 41. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 402 (Nov. 20).   
21 Also in the “why did those handling the case do it that way” category is whether, after Mr. Yerodia 
ceased to be a Minister, the Belgian magistrate could have withdrawn the initial warrant and issued a 
new one.  There may be sound reasons of Belgian law why this was not done.  However, withdrawing 
the warrant would seem to have left Belgium with greater control of the situation and in a more 
satisfactory position overall. 
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Historically, only a few inter-State disputes posing significant human rights legal 
issues have gotten through the jurisdictional filters required for ICJ consideration.   
¶ 19 Most importantly, in contentious inter-State cases, both parties must 
consent to jurisdiction.  Only about a third of U.N. members accept compulsory 
jurisdiction based on Article 36(2) of the Statute.  Many of these have significantly 
conditioned their acceptances.  Even some States usually seen as law-abiding 
paragons have limited their acceptances of jurisdiction so as to protect values they see 
as insufficiently reflected in existing international law.22 The United States withdrew 
its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in 1984; I see no prospect that the Bush 
Administration or any foreseeable successor will take a different view. 
¶ 20 In the 1960’s, the Court was in bad odor in many quarters for rejecting 
important human rights claims on jurisdictional grounds.  Some saw the Court’s S.W. 
Africa 1966 merits judgment as its lowest point.23  There, the Court at an earlier stage 
of the case found jurisdiction over claims by Liberia and Ethiopia that South Africa’s 
apartheid administration of South West Africa violated its League of Nations 
mandate.24  However, after a change of personnel, the Court was equally divided, 
giving the President, Sir Percy Spender of Australia, a deciding or “casting” vote.25  
He ruled that duties under the mandate were owed to the League, and that Liberia and 
Ethiopia did not have any legal interest in the subject matter of the dispute allowing 
them to challenge the apartheid regime in South West Africa. 
¶ 21 Of course, States do sometimes agree to compulsory jurisdiction, either 
generally or under a specialized treaty regime, so a few human rights cases get 
though.  Jurisdiction in the two Vienna Convention Consular Convention cases 
against the United States rested on the parties’ acceptance years ago of a separate 
compulsory dispute settlement protocol to the Consular Convention. The United 
States has not accepted another multilateral treaty with mandatory ICJ dispute 
settlement for many years, and I suspect it will not do so again any time soon. 
¶ 22 The D.R. Congo established jurisdiction against Belgium in the Arrest 
Warrant case based on both parties’ acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction.26   
III.   The Court’s Procedures   
¶ 23 Litigation in the ICJ can be slow, cumbersome, and expensive, 
particularly if parties vigorously contest jurisdiction and admissibility and other 
issues.  The Court has taken some steps to reduce complexity and delay,27 but 
                                                 
22 A notable example is Canada’s condition on its acceptance of jurisdiction at issue in Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).  Under the Norwegian Loans case, a 
respondent State can invoke against the applicant a qualification or limitation contained in the 
applicant’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 
(July 6).  
23 South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18). 
24 I.C.J. Reports 1962, at 319. 
25 See MALANCZUK, supra note 5, at 328-29.  
26 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 11, para. 27 (Feb. 14). 
27 See Crook, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. at 691; Crook, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. at 410-411; Crook, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 352.  
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problems remains.  The Court also has rather rudimentary procedures for presenting 
and assessing disputed evidence in cases with complicated disputed facts.   
¶ 24 Where the Court presses and the parties cooperate, simple cases like 
Arrest Warrant can move rather quickly; it was only sixteen months between filing 
and judgment in that case.  But more complex and fiercely contested cases can drag 
on for years.  Bosnia filed a substantial case alleging genocide against Yugoslavia in 
March 1993.  Less than a month later, the Court issued a strongly worded provisional 
measures order directing Yugoslavia to take all measures within its power to prevent 
genocide, an order it reaffirmed five months later.28  However, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
chose to plead its case very broadly, and the respondent contested it vigorously.  
Today, years after the case was filed, and after substantial proceedings on provisional 
measures, on jurisdiction and admissibility, and on counterclaims, the case is still 
pending.  
IV.       Membership of the Court   
¶ 25 It probably is not a smart thing for journeyman international lawyers to 
generalize about the members of the Court, but I will hazard some thoughts anyway.  
This seems a fair matter for discussion, since backgrounds and experiences inevitably 
shape the way judges approach cases before the Court. 
¶ 26 Although not written down, the U.N. custom is for a national of each of 
the Permanent Members of the Security Council to sit on the Court, with the ten 
remaining seats divided among jurists from the U.N.’s five regional groups.  This 
system has brought judges from various countries and backgrounds to the Court, but it 
tends to favor experience in foreign relations, especially in U.N. settings.  At least 
four current judges were legal advisers of their national foreign ministries,29 two were 
Foreign Ministers,30 two were their country’s permanent representatives to the U.N. in 
New York,31 and others previously represented their governments at diplomatic 
conferences or as legal advisers.  Of the fifteen judges, at least three (Judges 
Buergenthal, Higgins, and Kooijmans) were particularly known for their work in 
human rights law prior to joining the Court.32 Judge Herzegh also was known for his 
work on humanitarian law and in the Red Cross Movement. 
¶ 27 The point? That judges come to the Court from a variety of backgrounds, 
often involving extensive government service.  Those with extensive human rights 
backgrounds are a minority.  This is not to say that the others will not give human 
rights claims full understanding and fair appreciation.  It is simply to say that they 
may be receptive to other types of claims as well.   
                                                 
28 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Provisional Measures of Sept. 13). 
29 President Guillaume, Judge Shi, Judge Fleischhauer (who also served as UN Under Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel), and Judge Al-Khasawneh. 
30 Judges Kooijmans and Rezek. 
31 Judges Koroma and Elaraby. 
32 Judge Buergenthal served, inter alia, on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and on the 
Human Rights Committee; Judge Higgins on the Human Rights Committee; Judge Kooijmans was the 




V.      Conclusion  
¶ 28 Each of the aspects of the ICJ I’ve mentioned—its broad mandate, its 
limited jurisdiction, its procedures, and its personnel—will affect and may limit the 
ICJ’s role in developing and applying human rights law.  The Court has a general 
mandate, where human rights claims and claims derived from other areas of the law 
may well compete and have to be reconciled. 
¶ 29 This is not a bad thing.  In my view, wishful thinking and sloppy legal 
analysis tend to be too common in international human rights law.  At the end of the 
day, the process of testing and refining of claims through litigation before the only 
true World Court should help to produce a body of human rights law that is more 
broadly accepted and effective.    
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